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AFIT/GE/ENG/09-43 
Abstrac t 
In this thesis, a methodology is developed to experimentally test and evaluate a 
programmable logic device unde r gamma irradiation. The purpose of which is to 
determine the radiation effects and characterize the improvements of various hardening 
by design techniques.  The techniques analyzed in this thesis include Error Correction 
Coding (ECC) and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).   
The TMR circuit includes three different functional implementations of adders 
compared to TMR voted circuits of those same adders.   The TMR is implemented with 
the same functional adders and as a Functional TMR (FTMR) with three different 
function adders that are voted on. The three functional adders are: a behavioral adder that 
allows the FPGA synthesis software to create the implementation, a ripple carry adder 
that consists of multiple single bit full adders linked together, and a carry look a head 
adder that operates the fastest by using an algorithm that creates generate and propagate 
signals.  These adders are connected to single voter TMR and FTMR circuits to evaluate 
the improvements that could be obtained. 
 The ECC circuit includes Block RAM (BRAM) and Distributed RAM memory 
elements that are loaded both with ECC and non-error corrected data.  The circuit is 
designed to check for errors in memory data, stuck bit values in the memory, and the 
performance improvements that ECC provides the system.   
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 The results show that TMR or FTMR circuits failed at a rate at or above the single 
copy adders.  This results from the single point of failure created by the voting logic 
being in the radiation environment. However, when the TMR or FTMR circuit is moved 
off-chip, the TMR single point of failure is removed and the results demonstrate much 
lower SEU error rates.   
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CHARACTERIZATION OF HARDENING BY DESIGN TECHNIQUES ON 
COMMERCIAL, SMALL FEATURE SIZED FIELD-PROGRAMMABLE GATE 
ARRAYS 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Ove rview 
 This chapter covers the following topics: 
 1. Motivation  
 2. Problem Statement 
 3. Plan of Attack 
 3. Contributions 
 4. Sequence of Presentation 
1.2 Motivation  
 Space and terrestrial radiation sources are known to cause errors and malfunctions 
in integrated circuit designs.  These effects from subatomic particles and ionizing 
radiation on integrated circuits are referred to as Single Event Effects (SEE).  These 
effects can cause sequential and combinational elements of the integrated circuit to 
change states or values.  The traditional method of minimizing these effects in space 
environments is to use radiation hardened application specific integrated circuits and 
programmable logic devices.  However, these devices often require large lead times and 
cost orders of magnitude more than non-radiation hardened devices.  Therefore, various 
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organizations are investigating using commercially available circuits in these harsh 
environments in order to reduce time and budget. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
State of the art systems are increasingly be ing de veloped on Field Programmable 
Gate Arrays (FPGAs), due to their cost and schedule performance benefits over 
traditional Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs).   However, with newer 
FPGAs with design features at 90nm and below, radiation effects in both space and some 
terrestrial environments limit the effective use of FPGAs.   These effects often lead to the 
use of radiation hardened devices to limit these harmful effects.   
Various designs work to make FPGAs less susceptible to radiation and offer 
increased reliability over standard FPGA designs.  These design processes are called 
hardening by design.  The objective of this work is to characterize these improvements so 
that these designs can be used in non-critical space applications that traditionally require 
radiation hardened FPGAs.  Thus, the experimental design:  
1.  Evaluates the radiation effects on various hardened designs  
2.  Allows for analysis of failures 
3.  Allows for characterization of hardening by design techniques versus 
traditional non-hardened designs 
  
The specific goal of this research is to evaluate and characterize hardening by 
design techniques on 90nm FPGA circuits.  This facilitates replacement of physically 
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hardened ASIC and FPGAs, as well as allow for improvements in designs of non-
radiation hardened electronics.   
This research shows whether design hardening techniques such as Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR), F unctional Triple Modular Redundancy (FTMR) and Error 
Correction Coding (ECC) can reduce system vulnerability to ionizing radiation. 
1.4 Contributions 
 This thesis explores the effects of gamma radiation on different FPGA 
programming styles in an attempt to mitigate these effects on non radiation hardened 
FPGAs.  The contributions of this work include an analysis of commercial off the shelf 
reconfigurable electronics in radiation environments.  This is superior to the current use 
of radiation hardened devices in space environments.  The contributions of this work 
include: 
1.  Successful design of a system for sending, receiving and analyzing data from 
an FPGA device under radiation. 
2. Characterization of design hardening techniques versus standard FPGA 
programming.  Design hardening techniques include TMR, FTMR and ECC.  
3.  An evaluation of design hardening techniques tested, including error locations, 
causes, and performance improvements. 
1.5 Sequence of Presentation 
The remainder of this thesis is divided in to five chapters followed by supporting 
appendices.  Chapter 1 provides motivation, a basic problem statement, a plan of attack, 
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and contributions.  Chapter 2 provides background information relevant to developing 
radiation hardened design. Chapter 3 covers the methodology used to design and test the 
radiation hardened design. Chapter 4 covers results of the characterization of the design 
improvements and Chapter 5 provides conclusions and d iscussion on future work. The 
appendices contain information considered too lengthy to include in the main body of the 
text but which provide additional information for those interested parties. This 
information includes the wiring setup, software code used for testing, and the raw data 
obtained from the irradiations.
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter covers: 
 1. Basic Radiation Effects on Electronics 
 2. Field Programmable Gate Arrays 
 3. Related work 
2.2 Basic Radiation Effects on Electronics  
 This section covers basic definitions, the radiation source for experimentation, 
and the effects of ionizing radiation on a circuit. 
2.2.1 Definitions  
 Understanding radiation effects on electronics requires an understanding of a few 
basic terms (Radiation Effects & Analysis Home Page):  
• Ionizing Radiation – Electromagnetic radiation that has enough energy to overcome 
the binding of electrons in atoms or molecules.  
• Single Event Effect (SEE) - Any measurable effect to a circuit due to ion strikes.  
• Single Event Transient (SET) – A voltage pulse through a circuit caused by ion 
strikes. 
• Single Event Upset (SEU) - A change of state induced by an ionization damage to a 
circuit. SEUs are soft errors that a reset or rewriting of the device will cause nor mal 
device behavior.  
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• Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) - An event induced by a single energetic particle that 
causes multiple upsets or transients during its path through a device or system.  
• Single Hard Error (SHE) - An SEU which causes a permanent change to the operation 
of a device. An example is a stuck bit in a memory device.  
• Single Event Latchup (SEL) - A condition which causes loss of device functionality 
due to a single event induced high current state. An SEL may or may not cause 
permanent device damage, but requires power strobing of the device to resume 
normal device operations.  
• Single Event Burnout (SEB) – A condition which can cause device destruction due to 
a high current state in a power transistor.  
• Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) - A single ion induced condition in power 
transistors which may result in the formation of a conducting pa th in the gate oxide.  
2.2.2 Radiation Source 
The cobalt-60 isotope (Co-60) is used as the source of ionizing radiation for this 
experiment.  Co-60 undergoes beta decay with a half- life of 5.24 years releasing two 
gamma particles and one electron, illustrated in Figure 2.1.   
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Figure 2.1: Co-60 Decay Emitting 1 Electron and 2 Gammas 
Co-60 Sources
DUT
Top View
 
Aluminum Tube
 
Figure 2.2: Co-60 Gamma Irradiator Layout 
 A Co-60 source is available at the Ohio State University(OSU) Nuclear Reactor 
Lab(NRL) in Columbus, Ohio.  This gamma irradiator is shown in Figure 2.2.  It contains 
a six inch wide aluminum tube containing a movable platform that can be raised and 
lowered out of the irradiator.  The gamma irradiator cell itself sits on the bottom of a poo l 
of water and consists of 14 Co-60 sources evenly spread around the aluminum tube.   
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Figure 2.3: Dose Rate of Co-60 Irradiator (Herminghuysen) 
When the device under test (DUT) is lowered into the tube, the radiation dose is based on 
the location of the device relative to the center of the Co-60 source rods.   However, the 
dose curve is based on the distance of the DUT above the bottom of the moveable 
platform when the platform is resting on the bottom of the aluminum tube. An example 
radiation dose curve is depicted in Figure 2.3.   
2.2.3 Ionizing Radiation Effects on Electronics 
 Ionizing Radiation creates electron hole pairs in materials by freeing e lectrons 
from the atoms or molecules that they are bonded to.   When this occurs in electrically 
conductive materials, these electrons are free to quickly move back to lowest energy 
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states thus recombining the electrons with available holes almost instantly.  However, in 
nonconductive materials, such as gate oxides in nmos transistors, the electron hole pairs 
take longer to recombine. The electrons, having a higher mob ility than holes, are then 
drawn from the oxide leaving a positive charge in the oxide.  When power is applied to 
the gate on nmos devices, these holes with a positive charge are pushed toward the gate 
interface with the substrate.  This is a result of both the decrease in the distance between 
the gate charge and the substrate and the increased positive charge on the gate. In fact, if 
enough charge builds in the transistor’s gate oxide the NMOS circuit can turn on without 
a charge app lied to the gate input, effectively shor ting the transistor. Figure 2.4 shows the 
transistor after irradiation. 
     According to hole-trapping models, hole-traps are formed transistor gate 
oxides. If there is a positive-bias applied to an n-channel CMOS device, electrons are 
quickly swept out of the oxide in less than a pico-second due to the higher mobility of 
electrons compared to holes. Some electrons will recombine with the holes.  However, 
this varies depending on the electric field and the ionizing source. The holes are relatively 
immobile compared to the electrons and can cause a temporary negative threshold 
voltage shift.  
 
Figure 2.4: Result of Ionizing Radiation: For mation of a Shorting Path be tween the 
Source and Drain of NMOS Transistor (Arnold) 
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Depending on the applied electric field, the temperature, oxide thickness, and fabrication 
techniques the holes will slowly migrate toward the oxide-substrate interface by polaron 
hopping (Petrosky; Rollins, Wirthlin and Graham)  
2.3 Field Programmable Gate Arrays  
 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are a type of circuit that is 
programmed in the field rather than in a semiconductor fabrication. It consists of 
programmable interconnects in the circuit that allow the connection of various gates and 
structures.  These interconnects require a large amount of FPGA area resulting in a chip 
with very low gate density compared to Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs.) 
The vast majority of FPGAs are SRAM-based, although there are some flash and antifuse 
versions. Typically, the antifuse varieties are of interest to aerospace designers because 
they are more radiation hardened.  However, their increased costs reduce the advantages 
of using FPGA over ASICs.  Therefore, more and more often designers are looking to use 
non-hardened S RAM FPGAs in place of these design hardened devices. 
 FPGAs are currently manufactured by several manufacturers with Xilinx and 
Altera dominating the market.  Each manufacturer also has their own unique computer 
based programming tools for use with their specific FPGAs.  The Xilinx package of 
various FPGA development tools is the Integrated Synthesis Environment (ISE) Design 
Suite. This suite includes many tools with two main programming environments - ISE 
Foundation and Xilinx Platform Studio (XPS).  The ISE tool is used primarily for Very-
High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) Hardware Design Language (VHDL) 
implementations.   The XPS tool is used for implementing Intellectual Property (IP) cores 
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such as embedded processor designs like the MicroBlaze soft core and PowerPC 
microprocessors.  ISE VHDL projects can be implemented as IP cores inside XPS to 
integration of user created cores into XPS software (Xilinx Inc) 
 SRAM based FPGAs consist of control logic routing the devices in the FPGA 
fabric together.  An example of the SRAM cell that is the basic structure that makes up 
the FPGA is shown in Figure 2.5. 
2.4 Related Work  
 Two main organizations that are heavily involved in radiation effects research are 
Los Alamos National Laboratories and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.  They are 
two key players in radiation effects on circuits.  Therefore, many of the papers in this 
section come from their research and research that they suppor t in this field.  
 
Figure 2.5: Basic 6 Transistor SRAM Structure in FPGA 
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2.4.1 Hardening by Design Research and Simulations 
Significant research exists on hardening by design techniques.  This 
predominantly includes fault injection analysis of various hardened designs.  Previous 
work ranges from simple fault injection analysis of various TMR and Error Detection and 
Correction (EDAC) designs to proposals for more advanced design hardening techniques. 
An example of TMR fault injection shows TMR voting on incrementer and 
counters designs.  Counter intuitively, the results show the single voter TMR can produce 
results as bad as or worse than a single version of a counter without redundancy.  This is 
a result of the single point of failure inherent in the TMR design (Rollins, Wirthlin and 
Graham).   Table 2.1 shows the results of fault injection on four different TMR designs.  
This single point of failure can be fixed by various techniques including using feedback, 
final TMR voting off chip, or utilizing check voters which validate the results of the 
majority TMR voters (Rollins, Wirthlin and Graham).  Additionally, research 
de monstrates various EDAC techniques including ECC and more advanced techniques.  
One useful technique on FPGAs is called Lightweight EDAC (LEDAC). LEDAC 
implements array based code compared to traditional word or line encoding schemes.  
This allows for much greater error detection and correction than  
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Table 2.1: TMR Simulation Results (Rollins, Wirthlin and Graham)
 
 
ECC with less overhead (Karl, Samson and C lark).  This scheme is ide al for FPGAs due 
to their high level of multi-parallelism, meaning this EDAC could function with no 
existing FPGA hardware. 
2.4.2 FPGA Radiation Analysis 
 Radiation testing of the newest radiation hardened and non-radiation hardened 
FPGAs are on-going for space and terrestrial applications.  This research indicates that 
the primary SEUs occur in the logic memory of the SRAM FPGA.    These papers 
demonstrate that configuration memory and Input/Output (I/O) pads are less likely to 
have SEUs effect the outputs of the FPGA since they require multiple bits to be changed 
in order for an error occur (Ceschia, Violante and Reorda).  Additionally, dose ranges on 
radiation hardened devices are shown to meet the minimum radiation hardened standard 
of greater than 300 krad.  Doses on non-radiation hardened devices are generally an order 
of magnitude lower (Brown and Brewer).  
 Single Event Upsets at ground level are also observed showing the need to add 
hardening by design techniques to some safety critical applications in terrestrial 
environments as well (Claeys and Simoen). 
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter discusses relevant radiation effects on electronics, some basic FPGA 
information and a summary of some related research in the field of radiation effects of 
FPGAs and specifically hardening by design techniques. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Ove rview 
This chapter discusses the methodology for analysis of the hardening by radiation 
techniques.  The materials covered in this chapter inc lude the test design, the 
experimental setup, a nd the format of the data for analysis.  The test design, covered in 
Section 3.2, describes the hardening by design techniques.  Section 3.3 discusses how the 
hardware and software were designed for the experiment.  Section 3.4 discusses the test 
plan including how the data is received for the radiation experiment and how that data is 
analyzed to produce results.  Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes the Chapter.  
3.2 Design 
 The design is setup to test the effects of Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), 
Functional TMR (FTMR), and Error Correction Coding (ECC).   
3.2.1 Redundant Circuits with Voting 
 There are several methods of voting on redundant logic or functionally redundant 
logic in order to reduce the effects of SEUs on the outputs of a logic module.  The most 
common of these is the use of triple modular redundancy, shown in Figure 3.1, to mask 
faults.   This technique triplicates all inputs and logic and passes the results to a bit-wise 
voter unit that takes the majority result to provide an output.   
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Figure 3.1: Simple Triple Modular Redundancy Voter 
 Single voter TMR systems can result in a single point of failure. Thus, several 
techniques have been developed to mitigate the errors caused by the single point of 
failure in a TMR system. These techniques include three voter TMRs, word wise TMRs 
and buffered TMRs.  
Three voter TMRs provide three separate copies of the outputs, which greatly 
reduces the errors from the single point of failure of a single voter system. This system is 
then eventually passed to a single voter for the final result.  However, this step adds much 
less relative error than voting at each intermediate step.   
Word-wise TMRs involve forcing the FPGA configuration to vote on the output 
value in multiple bit sections rather than bit by bit which is the default for voter logic.  
This word wise voting has been shown to decrease errors in simulations.   
 
17 
Another approach involves the use of buffer based TMRs which has been shown 
to reduce the SEU effects in the voter logic in simulations An example of a buffer based 
TMR is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 The thesis analyzes the effects on single voter TMRs versus different functional 
implementations.  Additionally, it investigates improvements possible by using a 
Functional TMR that takes a vote on three functional implementations instead of three 
copies of the same implementation.  To show the improvements of triplicating TMR 
logic, the control board counts and outputs the results from each TMR for analysis of 
improvements of a final TMR that is placed off-chip.  Due to constraints of the serial 
output to the PC, a total count of the control board TMR errors is used for analysis.    
3.2.2 Error Detection and Correction Coding 
 There is a wide range of error detection and correction techniques that are used to 
protect memory data.  These techniques range from simple error detection schemes, such 
as parity checks, to the more advanced error correcting code, some of which are currently 
used in memory systems.   These error detection and correction techniques have  
 
Figure 3.2: Single Bit of LUT vs. Buffered TMR Voter  
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add itiona l data stored in memory in order to allow for error detection.  Then if errors are 
detected, the data is corrected by either resending the data from its source or by including 
sufficient information in the data to allow it to correct itself.    
One of the most common types of ECC memory invo lves the use of Hamming 
Code.  Even though a single cosmic ray can upset many physically neighboring bits in a 
memory system, such memory systems are designed so that neighboring bits belong to 
different words, so that an SEU causes only a single error in any particular word, and can 
be corrected by a single-bit error correcting code. As long as not more than a single bit in 
any particular word is affected by an error between accesses, a memory system presents 
the illusion of an error- free memory.  The Hamming Code is based additional memory 
spaces which store error correcting bits with every memory line.  These error correcting 
bits allow for any single bit error to be corrected and any two bit error to be detected.   
3.3 Experiment 
 This section summarizes the test framework including the DUT, the radiation 
experiment and the plan for the experiments run at the OSU reactor. 
3.3.1 Device-Under-Test  
The FPGA devices under test for these radiation experiments are Xilinx Virtex 4 
Mini-mod ules mounted on an Avnet Mini-Module Baseboard, pictured below in Figure 
3.3.  The baseboard contains a socket for the two – 2 x 32 2mm FPGA headers to connect 
to multiple I/O interfaces and power supplies on the baseboard. The entire baseboard and 
FPGA Mini-Module combination is useful due to its dimensions be ing less than 4 by 6 
inches, which is very suitable for this particular radiation experiment.   
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Figure 3.3: DUT Virtex 4 M ini-Module 
Additional features of the Mini-module include  autonomous operation without the 
baseboard, which could be extremely useful for additional experimental setups. The 
Xilinx Virtex 4 Mini-Module is designed as a complete system on a module.  The Mini –
Module packages all the necessary functions needed for an embedded FPGA onto a tiny 
footprint. The on-board MicroBlaze core provides processing capabilities, while the 
configurable I/O settings offer versatile interface options.  
The FPGA contained on the mini-module is a Virtex 4 SC4VFX12, referred to as 
Virtex 4 FX12, FPGA. The Virtex 4 FX12 FPGA contains an array of 64 x 24 logic 
blocks supporting a maximum of 86 kilobits (Kb) of distributed memory plus the separate 
80 Kilobytes (KB) (or 640 Kb) of block ram.  The FPGA contains 90nm transistor 
technology with 10 layers of metal interconnects and triple oxide technology running 
internally at 1.2 Volts (V).   
The distributed memory is contained in the logic slices of the FPGA and therefore 
consumes resources that could be used for other logic on the FPGA. The maximum width 
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of the distributed memories for the Virtex 4 is 1024, however, to maximize slice 
utilization smaller sizes are used and can be placed without causing routing problems 
when ISE places the logical slices on the FPGA. If larger memory sizes are needed, the 
block ram slices are generally more suitable as they are contained on separate slices that 
are only used for memory storage and therefore can be in a single memory structure as 
large as 80 KB (Xilinx Inc). 
The triple oxide technology involves using three different gate oxide thicknesses 
in order to increase speed internally while still allowing the I/O at 3.3 V and the slower 
core logic containing the configuration data. The thick gate oxide is designed to 
withstand at least 3.6 V from the I/O transistor interface.  The middle oxide or mid-ox 
thickness is for core logic that does not need to be fast and therefore the increased oxide 
thickness saves FPGA power. The main use of mid-ox is for the millions of transistors 
that store the configuration (six transistors for each configuration bit).  Giving these 
transistors a thicker gate oxide reduces their leakage current subs tantially (Xilinx Inc). 
3.3.2 Hardware setup  
In addition to the DUT explained above, the hardware setup used to analyze the 
data from the DUT consists of the several parts.  These parts include an ML506 FPGA 
board, two break-out boxes, two Fluke Multi-meters with data logging, a laptop 
computer, and associated wires.  Additionally, Agilent Digital Logic Analyzers and 
Oscilloscopes are used in DUT design, analysis, and testing but not at the OSU irradiator. 
Figure 3.4 describes the hardware setup and Figure 3.5 shows the equipment connected in 
the lab. 
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Figure 3.4: Hardware Setup 
  
Controller Board Device Under Test Board 
Break-out Box 1
Break-out Box 2
 
Figure 3.5: Picture of Hardware Setup 
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Figure 3.6: Virtex 5 ML505/6 Control Board 
The ML506 FPGA board pictured in Figure 3.6 is utilized for analysis and display 
of results to the laptop computer.  The specific board hardware used includes 32 singled 
I/O header connections, the FPGA, pushbuttons, serial port and LEDs.   This board is 
utilized since it contains an FPGA with a built- in MicroBlaze microprocessor core, 
allowing for programming in C++ in addition to VHDL.  
The breakout boxes consist of wiring to connect the single-ended inputs of the 
DUT and the control board, shown in Figure 3.7.  Details of wiring attachments are 
contained in Appendix A.  The breakout boxes utilize RJ45 jacks to connect eight 15’ 
Cat5 Ethernet cables to the send data to and from the DUT. 
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Figure 3.7: Breakout box connecting to Controller Board prior to Irradiation 
These breakout boxes effectively transmit the single ends signals in excess of 15 
ft.  However, some noise and approximately 25 ns of signal delay occur during 
transmission. This results in signals synchronization issues during testing and which are 
remedied by the having individual signals sent on the positive edge of the clock not being 
read until the negative edge of the clock, approximately 150 ns after transmission of the 
data.    An example of the clock signal at the DUT and control board I/Os is displayed in 
Figure 3.8. 
The laptop for the programming the boards and collecting the data is a Dell 
Latitude D830.    The laptop contains HyperTerminal software for communication with 
the MicroBlaze processor on the FPGA and Xilinx software necessary for programming 
the FPGA Boards. 
In addition to the equipment used for the radiation testing, a n Agilent Logic 
Analyzer is utilized to view the signals transmitted between the DUT and control board.   
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Input at  
Control Board
Output of DUT
 
Figure 3.8: Clock Pin Transmission from DUT to Control Board (Scale: 20ns/ horizontal, 
1V/ vertical) 
This device allows analys is of data synchronization and functionality o f the DUT 
both before and after the irradiations.  An example of the data from the logic analyzer is 
shown in Figure 3.9.  The figure shows how the data during the positive clock cycle is 
noisier.  
3.3.4 Software Setup 
Two separate software setups are made for the radiations tests with the software 
for both the DUT and the controller board programmed in VHDL utilizing Xilinx ISE 
software.  However, the control board files are transferred over to Xilinx XPS as an IP  
core, such that the MicroBlaze microprocessor core can be utilized for display and 
analysis of results.  The actual code utilized is on stored as Appendix B. 
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Control Board Read
Glitch in Data
 
Figure 3.9: Data Synchronization with Clock 
3.3.4.1 TMR Software Setup 
The first software setup consists of DUT code to test triple modular redundancy 
versus the three different designs of adders.  This code utilizes the 29 single ended I/Os 
on the DUT board to receive and to send out adder and TMR results at a frequency of at 
most 3.24MHz.  The maximum frequency is determined by observing line delays and 
noise on the single-ended I/O lines.  This ind icates that the line has noise induced errors 
for up to 50 ns after transmission indicating the clock needs to be run at 10MHz or slower 
in order to capture data during the second half of the clock cycle.  The system is tested 
with various frequencies divisors based on the original 100MHz DUT clock.  This 
resulted in a minimum frequency divisor to capture data without capturing erroneous data 
of 32.  This indicates that the logic analyzer recognizes one and zero value transitions 
differently than the control board.  
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An illustration of the code with the three adders and the FTMR outputting data is 
shown in Figure 3.10.  An illustration of the code used to compare different TMR 
structures with the FMTR structure is shown in F igure 3.11. 
The FTMR/Adder DUT code is paired with controller board code that is built to 
compare the results to the truth source produced on the controller board and display the 
results through the UART connection to the PC containing HyperTerminal software.    
The comparator software operates at the same frequency as the DUT board clock and the 
comparator then outputs data to registers for display by the MicroBlaze processor.   The 
processor operates at 235 MHz on the Virtex 5 board and analyzes and controls the 
display of data contained in the registers. The data is then displayed to the user via the 
RS232 Serial Communication IP Core running at 9600 bps. This means that if errors are 
occurring faster than can be displayed by the serial communication, the data is lost.  
Therefore, error totals are displayed in order to identify errors that are not displayed.  
This means that off-chip voting must be done real-time on the control board with running 
totals of errors since post analysis may not be possible if multiple errors occur.  A 
diagram of this structure is shown in Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.10: Virtex 4 FPGA FTMR/Adder Structure
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Figure 3.11: Virtex 4 FPGA TMR/FTMR Structure 
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Figure 3.12: Virtex 5 FPGA FTMR/TMR/Adder Analysis Structure 
The total resource allocation for each functional adder in comparison to the TMR 
structure is important to analyzing the potential radiation damage. The DUT utilization 
summary is contained in the Table 3.1.  These numbers reflect the FPGA components 
used but do not reflect the actual structure of these components.  
Table 3.1: Utilization of Several Functional Units 
 
  
Module slices Slice Regs LUTs
RC 3 4 3
Behav 4 4 12
CLA 3 4 3
FTMR 12 6 24
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The designs of the ripple carry and carry look ahead adders are shown in Figures 
3.13 and 3.14, where a and b are the adder inputs and S and C are the Sum and Carry 
outputs, respectively.  The behavioral adder is not shown since it is created by the Xilinx 
synthesis tool and is essentially a black bo x with A and B inputs and S and C outputs. 
The actual structures of the LUTs used for each structure can also be viewed 
through use of the ISE tools.  The logic used for the first bits of each adde r is shown in 
 
Figure 3.13: Ripp le Carry Adder Structure 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Carry Look Ahead Adder Structure 
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Figures 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17.  These figures represent only a small section of the devices 
with the carry look ahead adder also having additional logic for the propagate and 
generate func tions. 
 
Figure 3.15: 1st Bit of RC Adder 
 
Figure 3.16: 1s t Bit of Behavioral Adder 
 
Figure 3.17: 1st Bit of Carry Look ahead Adder 
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3.3.4.2 ECC Memory Software Setup 
The second software setup is built to test the radiation effects on the FPGA 
containing various memory structures.  The four structures included 32 KB of block ram, 
20 KB of BRAM with ECC, up to 8 KB of distributed memory, and up to 13 KB of 
distributed memory with ECC.  These four structures are chosen since they maximize the 
available block ram, 80KB, and available distributed memory, up to 86 Kb.  The memory 
units are each addressed separately with the ent ire memory structure be ing read or  written 
to every 0.0202 seconds.   This means only one memory address is read per clock cycle 
to avoid collisions between data being sent out by different memory units.  The addresses 
of the structures are shown in Table 3.2 below.  The memory is loaded with equal 
sections of four different hex memory patterns, 00, FF, 55, and C3.  T hese hex patterns 
translate to binary 00000000, 11111111, 01010101, and 11000011. These are chosen to 
determine if the different memory values and patterns are more susceptible to radiation 
induced SEUs.   
In add ition to the error check, the memory structure runs  a stuck b it check which 
takes 3 read/write cycles.  The stuck bit check first loads the negated memory values into 
each memory address during one write cycle.  Then it checks the memory during the 
following memory cycle.  Then the check reloads the original pattern back into memory.  
The frequency of the stuck b it check is once every 1021 read cycles, however this can 
easily be altered or removed if stuck bits do not show up in the data during radiations.   
The structure of the DUT board is shown in Figure 3.18.  For each memory 
address, the board outputs the corresponding memory information and checks it with the  
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Figure 3.18: Virtex 4 FPGA Memory Structure 
expected value for that location.  For ECC memories, this means that DUT checks the 13 
bit encoded value.  Any discrepancies are reported to the controller board as 8 bit data 
plus the error correction code.   For the ECC portion of memory, the data is checked for 
errors while it is still encoded. Then if there are errors, it is decoded for transmission back 
to the control board.  This is done so that errors that are corrected by the ECC could be 
seen to evaluate the performance of the ECC. Additionally when errors are detected, the 
correct value is rewritten into the memory address to attempt to fix the errors. 
The controller board software structure combined with this memory DUT software 
structure contains the logic to take all the memory errors and displays the total number of 
errors differentiating between the original patterns and the inverted patterns when they 
are loaded into each section of the memory.   Additionally, when an error occurs, the 
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control board outputs the data with a time stamp based on the DUT clock.  However, if 
errors at multiple addresses occur faster than the data can be captured by the UART 
running at 9600bps, the actual error is not be displayed and only the error count can be 
used for analysis.  This method o ffers a glimpse at the error data but primarily counts 
total errors in the memory structure for purpos e of analys is.  To account for this known 
system limitation the da ta is fixed by the DUT when an error is found and the control 
board records how many single bit and multiple bit errors occurred in each memory 
structure.  Figure 3.19 shows the structure of the control board IP Cores, specifically the 
test IP core consisting of the VHDL code that captures the data from the DUT. 
MicroBlaze UART
IP Core
User Logic
DUT clock, data
Addressing 
& Data 
Capture
Data  
Analysis and 
Display
 
Figure 3.19: Virtex 5 Memory Analys is Structure 
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Table 3.2: Memory Structure Addresses 
 
3.4 Test Plan 
 Radiation analysis is conducted on a maximum of 10 FPGA Mini-modules.  The 
initial test is run at 50 krad (Si)/hr dose rate.  This dose rate is expected to cause data 
errors and board failure based on research with previous generations of FPGAs (Wang, 
Katz and Cronquist).  However, since no data is obtained on Virtex 4 FPGAs or the 
packaged FPGAs such as the Virtex 4 Mini-module, the first radiation determines the 
radiation dose rates for additional runs.   In addition to the error data collected for 
analysis, current and voltage data is also recorded in order to predict expected errors and 
device failure on future runs.   This ideally allows for devices to be powered off or 
removed from the source before any permanent damage occurs. The analysis beginning 
with the FTMR/Adder structure contains the most variety of test structures for analys is. 
This test compares three designs of adders to a TMR system that votes on the outputs of 
all three adders.  This test shows which designs are the most robust adder designs and 
shows the performance improvement of both on-chip and off chip FTMR structures.  
Next, the FTMR/TMR structure is radiated to evaluate the improvements of the FTMR 
structure compared to traditional TMR structures.  Finally, the memory structure tests are 
Memory Structure Addresses Base Address End Address
BRAM          0-16k 0000000000000000 0011111111111111
BRAM ECC 16-32k 0100000000000000 0111111111111111
Dist. RAM 32-40k 1000000000000000 1001111111111111
Dist. RAM ECC 40-48k 1010000000000000 1011111111111111
BRAM 48-64k 1100000000000000 1111111111111111
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run to evaluate the radiation expos ure on a larger por tion of the FPGA, as well as, 
evaluate the improvements of ECC memory over non-ECC memory in bot h BRAM and 
distributed memories.  These tests are lowest priority since the errors observed by the 
control board are difficult to trace since the errors could be caused by the additional logic 
on the DUT that looks like errors in the actual memory addresses tested.   
 3.4.1 Data Format  
 The data output from the control board contains data that is used to characterize 
radiation effects on the various hardening by design techniques.  There are two basic 
formats of data that is output depending on the experiment being run.  The first type of 
data is for the adder and TMR data.  The second type of data contains address and data 
information from the memory system. Both sets of data include a system clock for 
analysis.  All data values are in Hexadecimal, which shorts the size of the output line, 
thus increasing the amount of data that can be displayed.  
 The adder TMR data is listed Table 3.3.  The data shows each of the four 
functional units with the current status compared to the truth value of that unit, followed 
by the error count of the function unit. The functional units are followed by the current 
status and error counts of the three different types of counter being tested.  This data is 
shorter than the adder TMR data since the counter outputs are not sent to the control 
board but instead the error code produced by the majority voter on the counters is sent to 
the control board.  S imilarly, the data for the FTMR/TMR irradiations contains the four  
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Table 3.3: TMR Data Collection For mat 
 
functional units with outputs displayed in the same format.  This is followed by the 
counter data tested.  
 The format of the memory software structure includes address, memory data, 
clock and cumulative errors for each of the four memory types.  The cumulative errors 
are necessary since the serial communication to the PC is limited to 9600 bps and 
therefore only some data errors is displayed if they are sent to the control board while 
another error is be ing displayed.  
3.5 Methodology Summary   
 The system is built to test the radiation effects on the Virtex 4 FPGA.  The DUT 
for this analysis is a Virtex 4 Mini-module.  Section 3.2 describes the hardware setup 
with the control board that provides inputs, analysis and data display to a PC.  The two 
test setups for analysis are described in Section 3.3.   They include  a memory and ECC 
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memor y setup and a TMR setup.  Section 3.4 describes the test plan for the irradiations at 
OSU NRL. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Chapter Ove rview 
 This chapter covers the following material:   
1. Radiations Summary 
2. Current Draw during Radiation Testing 
3. FTMR/TMR/Adder Results 
4. Memory Results 
The raw data is in Appendix C, while the detailed results of each radiation run is in 
Appe ndix D.   
4.2 Radiations Summary 
 The analys is invo lves eight irradiations.  The radiations all use new Virtex 4 
Mini-mod ules which are tested in the lab prior to radiation and operate satisfactorily 
without producing any errors.  Radiation #2 is not complete because the current draw 
reached the maximum allowed by the Agilent Power Supply and therefore is terminated 
early.  This meant that for the remaining runs a new power supply is used.    Radiation #3 
also did not produce a total ionizing dose for failure since it is removed while the FPGA 
DUT is still operating. Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 summarize the radiation dose rates and 
time to failure for each run.   
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Figure 4.1 Radiations 1-8: Shows krad(Si)/hr vs. Pos ition in Tube  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Radiations 
Radiation # 
Dose Rate 
(krad(Si)/hr) 
Radiation 
Time 
Time to 
Failure 
Total 
Ionizing 
Dose Test Run 
1 50 0:19:17 0:19:17 16.71 FTMR/Adder 
2 35 0:36:30 N/A 21.29 FTMR/Adder 
3 35 2:57:24 N/A 103.48 FTMR/Adder 
4 67 0:31:02 0:31:02 34.65 FTMR/Adder 
5 35 2:42:45 2:42:45 94.94 FTMR/Adder 
6 50 1:06:55 1:06:55 57.99 TMR/FTMR 
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A summary of the different software codes is described in Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 
4.4.  Table 4.2 shows the code version that is used on each run.  Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
describe the differences in each code setup used.  DUT code version 2.2 included a 
replacing the 4 bit counter TMR result code with the carryouts from each of the 4 
functional units being tested.  This is done to get a better understanding of the effects on 
the whole adder units. 
Table 4.2: Software Configurations for each Radiation 
 
Table 4.3: DUT Code Versions 
 
Table 4.4: Control Board Code Versions 
 
Radiation # Date Tested Control Board Version DUT code Version Outputs of DUT
1 1/23/2009 1 1 FTMR/3 Adders/Cntr TMR
2 2/25/2009 2 2 FTMR/3 Adders/Cntr TMR
3 2/25/2009 2 2 FTMR/3 Adders/Cntr TMR
4 3/2/2009 3 2 FTMR/3 Adders/Cntr TMR
5 3/2/2009 3 2 FTMR/3 Adders/Cntr TMR
6 3/2/2009 3 2.1 FTMR/3 TMRs/Cntr TMR
7 3/13/2009 4 2.2 FMTR/3 Adders
8 3/13/2009 4 2.3 FMTR/CLA Adders
DUT Code Versions Outputs Change
1 CLA, Behavioral, RC, FTMR Original Code
2 CLA, Behavioral, RC, FTMR, Counter TMR data Major modifications of communication between boards
2.1 3 TMRs(CLA, Behavioral, RC), FTMR, Counter TMR data Outputs to I/O Pins
2.2 CLA, Behavioral, RC, FTMR counter TMR data replaced by Carry outs of adders and FTMR
2.3 3 CLA Adders, FTMR Outputs to I/O Pins
Control Code Version Change
1 Original working code
2
Change communication between boards to make it into a robust design without errors and 
added counter TMR to additional output lines
3
Minor modifications to output format to include regular clock updates at 10 sec intervals and 
error counts at 2 min intervals
4 Setup to receive and compare 5 bit inputs from DUT, also analyzes data in a control board TMR
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The results of the radiations indicate that the total ionizing dose to cause device 
failure on the Virtex 4 Mini-modules is difficult to predict.   In fact the largest dose rate 
in Radiation #4 experienced failure at nearly twice the tot al ionizing dose that caused 
radiation #1 to fail. This is likely the result of the code revision done after radiation #1 
but could also be a result of variations in the modules that are used for analysis.  
Additionally, these variations could be the result of variations in placement of the device 
within the gamma irradiator itself.   The position could only be controlled in the vertical 
axis but the actual rotation of the device in the gamma cell is not controllable.  Therefore, 
an analys is of current draw versus device failure and SEUs is shown in Section 4.3 .   
4.3 Current Draw  
 The current draw of the FPGAs ind icates the amount that leakage current in the 
FPGA increases due to the EHPs described in Section 2.  It indicates when SEU might 
cause incorrect values to be recorded.  This current is used to determine at what point an 
SEB would be expected to permanently damage the device under radiation.  Figures 4.2 
and 4.3 show the current during each irradiation for all 6 radiations.   These tables are 
divided between the 35 krad (Si)/hr radiations and the higher dose rates, so that trends are 
easily observed.   
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Figure 4.2: FPGA Supply Current vs. Time at 35 krad (Si)/hr 
Figure 4.2 shows similar current draw for 35 krad (Si)/hr radiations.  Both 
Radiations 5 and 8 experienced enough radiation effects to experience device failure. As 
discussed above radiation 2 and 3 did not result in device failure before the DUT is 
removed from radiation.  However, the devices did not experience similar maximum 
currents pr ior to shutdown as expected from Wang et al discussed in Chapter 2.  Based on 
these results, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine device failure based on current 
draw alone.  One explanation for this result is the fact that the FPGA is integrated into the 
device unlike previous FPGAs which are plugged into integrated circuit sockets.  
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Therefore the current analysis may reveal more consistent results prior to failure by 
measuring the three FPGA power supplies (1.2V, 2.5V and 3.3V) as they connect directly 
to the FPGA as opposed to the current draw through the constant voltage 5 V power 
supply which is measured. 
Figure 4.3 shows the currents of the three higher radiations.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the expected dose rate for maximum errors is not known prior to testing.  
Therefore, radiation 1 is used as a baseline.  However, after the device used in Radiation 
#3 did not fail and produced limited SEU errors after nearly 3 hours with a dose rate of 
35 krard compared to the 50 krad of Radiation #1, a higher radiation dose rate is used in 
Radiation #4.  Thus Radiation #4 resulted in device failure faster than expected.     
 
Figure 4.3: Supp ly Current Vs Time at 50 krad (Si)/hr and 67 krad (Si)/hr 
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Radiation #6 is conducted to re-evaluate the 50 krad (Si)/hour dose rate and 
showed that some other effects is occurring in Radiation #1 that didn’t occur in the other 
radiation.  Therefore, for the analysis, Radiation #1 data is being considered incomplete 
and Radiations #4 and #6 are assumed to be the estimated radiation TID for failure.  
Radiation #7 also did not experience TID failure and therefore it is also being excluded 
for this purpose.  
4.4 FTMR/Adder Error Results 
FTMR and each functional adders error results are in the Table 4.5. The data 
shows that the FTMR circuit experienced the most errors at the output of the DUT.  This 
result is initially surprising based on the expected improvements of a TMR circuit over a 
single copy of a circuit.  However, when analyzing the device utilization of each 
component, the FTMR circuit utilization is higher than any of the adders by themselves.   
Based on the results of the above test, an analysis of using traditional TMR designs of the 
3 different functional units is done.  This implementation is done to verify whether a 
single copy TMR design can outperforms the FTMR.  The TMRs were based on using 3 
identical copies for each TMR.  FTMR vs. TMR analysis error results are in the Table 
4.6. 
Table 4.4: Single Adder vs. Single FTMR Errors (* partial radiations) 
Radiat ion # 
Dose Rate 
(krad(Si)/hr) 
RC Adder 
Errors 
Behavioral 
Adder 
Errors 
CLA Adder 
Errors FTMR Errors 
2* 35 0 0 0 1 
3* 35 0 0 1 3900 
4 67 4260 0 6124 6657 
5 35 1160759 1454061 1618623 1532825 
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Table 4.5: TMR vs. FTMR Errors 
Radiation # 
Dose 
Rate(krad(Si)/hr) 
RC TMR 
Errors 
Behavioral 
TMR Errors 
CLA TMR 
Errors FTMR Errors 
6 50 6293004 4763530 5354154 4763530 
 
 The results of comparing various TMR units with single triplicated functional 
units reveal that the FTMR design can produces results worse than the simple single 
functional unit TMRs.  This indicates that the likelihood of errors on any functional 
component increases proportionally to other functional units.  Therefore, these results 
indicate that an FTMR circuit does not produce increased protection as hypothesized in 
Chapter 3.   
For further analysis of the data, the cumulative errors over time for radiation # 4, 
5, & 6 are shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6.  These figures show the errors just prior to 
device failure since the errors prior to this point are extremely rare and appear to vary 
randomly when compared to the results produced as the FPGA reaches its failure point.  
These graphs end when either the clock signal stopped transmitting to the control board 
or where the correct results being output to the controller board stopped being sent for an 
entire display cycle through the serial communication.   
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Figure 4.4 Errors on Radiation #4 67krad (Si)/hr 
 
Figure 4.5: Error on Radiation #5 35 krad (Si)/hr 
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Figure 4.6: Errors on Radiation#6 50 krad (Si)/hr 
 These three figures show the majority of errors just prior to device failure.  This 
results in a major limitation of this type of testing.  In fact less than 1000 total errors, 
across all functional units, occur prior to the minute before device failure on all 8 
radiations. 
 Add itional analysis of the results indicates that the ripple carry adder has the best 
performance of the three types of adders analyzed.  This result was actually be tter than 
the result of the single voter FTMR implemented.   
4.6 Results Summary 
The results show the single voter FTMR device does not perform as well as 
traditional TMR circuits built with single copies of more robust adders.  This shows that 
the cycles that have error occurrences on different functional units has less to do with 
structure and more to do with the EHP in the individual structures.  Additionally, the 
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FTMR circuit performed worse than single devices outputting data to the control board in 
almost all cases.  However, when the FTMR is moved off chip, the results are 
significantly improved.    This indicates that the single point of failure of a TMR circuit 
should be mitigated by one of the techniques discussed in Chapter 2. 
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V.  Conclusions 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter covers the following material: 
1.  A basic conclusion statement 
2. Applications 
3. Future Studies 
5.2 Conclusion Statement 
Radiation effects produces SEUs and device failure in Virtex 4 Mini-modules 
allowing characterization of the hardened by design components.   Single Voter TMR and 
FTMR structures placed on the DUT experiences error rates as large as the single units 
tested.  
5.3 Applications 
The results show single voter TMR designs do not necessarily improve design 
hardness when the TMR design is also radiated.  The TMRs placed after three 
functionally different combinational adders actually had worse performance results than 
that of the behavioral adder that Xilinx defaults to.  These results are mainly caused by 
the differences in device structure causing more space to be utilized and therefore more 
errors to be produced.    
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5.4 Future Work 
Possible areas of future study include analysis of more advanced hardening design 
techniques such as those discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  These techniques for TMR 
include using word-wise TMR voting or developing a buffer based TMR implementation.  
Alternatively, more robust modularly redundant designs could be proposed that would 
limit the effects of SEUs on the FPGAs.    
 Another possible area of study is to compare varying module sizes between 
triplicated TMRs.  This could be used to opt imize the placement of voting logic to 
maximize error protection while minimizing additional size overhead caused by the 
voting logic. 
 Additionally, further development of this testing methodo logy could be done to 
eliminate possible errors that could have occurred based on the stress placed on the clock 
signals.  This would require significant numbers of tests to evaluate performance of the 
FPGA boards in the radiation environments. 
 Finally, these structures could be implemented as gate level devices across 
multiple slices in the FPGA.  This would increase the FPGA utilization size and 
potentially will allow analysis of error locations by analyzing the signals in between the 
individual slices 
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